Borrowing Costs and Agricultural Loan Demand in Low Income Countries by Adams, Dale W. & Nehman, Gerald I.
( ... 
' 
Studies in 
Agricultural Finance 
Economics and Sociology 
Occasional Paper No. 368 
BORROWING COSTS AND AGRICULTURAL I.DAN DElVIAND 
IN I.DW INCOME COUNTRIES 
by 
D. W Adams and G. I. Nehman 
September 24, 1976 
Departrrent of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology 
'Ihe Chio State University 
2120 Fyffe Road 
Columbus, Ohio 43210 
' 
' 
Borrowing Costs and Agricultural Loan Demand 
in Low Income Countries* 
by 
D. W Adams and G. I. Nehman** 
During the past couple of decades interest rates on agricultural loans in 
low income countries have been routinely maintained low and inflexible. In most 
cases, these rates have been lower than regular commercial rates, and o~en 
lower than increases in overall prices. As a result, negative real rates of 
interest have been charged on many of these loans, especially during the past 
5 years. Various arguments are used to justify these policies. One of the most 
commonly used is that the demand for agricultural loans, especially among small 
farmers, is very sensitive to changes in the contractual rate of interest. It 
is assumed that higher rates would discourage loan demand, retard investments 
in productive enterprises, and also slow the adoption of new technology. It 
is further assumed that low interest rates on loans are an efficient way of pro-
viding economic assistance to rural poor, and that these low rates help eliminate 
moneylenders who are charging exploitative rates on their loans. 
Despite the fact that billions of dollars worth of loans have been, and 
are being made under these policies, there has been very little evidence pre-
sented to substantiate these critical assumptions. In part, this is due to 
11Y2thodological problems associated with loan deITEnd analysis. After a brief 
discussion of so11Y2 of these problems, we go on to argue that many farmers in 
low income countries may be relatively insensitive to changes in the contractual 
rate of interest on their loans. Farm level data from several countries are pre-
sented to support this view. 
' 
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Methodological Problems 
t.:-.alysis of agricultural loan demand has been hanpered by at least two major 
problems: (1) actual estimation of a demand function for credit, and (2) deter-
mining the "price of credit" to use in the demand analysis. The first problem 
is one of specifying and IIEasuring the determinants of loan demand with the lim-
i ted data which are typically available. In rrany cases, rural borrowing is for 
a mixture of fa.rnr-firm as well as household uses. Further, the borrower realizes 
little direct satisfaction from a loan. The loan sinply adds to the liquidity 
pool from which the household draws for its consumption, production and invest-
IIEnt activities. The utility of the loan is derived from these various uses of 
additional liquidity. Adequate data are usually not available to allow corrpre-
hensive analysis of how all of these activities affect loan demand. As a result, 
it is difficult to separate rnoveIIEnt along a demand schedule due to changes in 
' the price of the loan, from changes in the amount borrowed caused by shifts in 
the demand schedule. 
' 
Because of the lack of data on the various economic activities of the finn-
household, researchers have been forced to estimate partial loan demand schedules. 
This is done by calculating marginal efficiency of investIIEnt schedules for var-
ious fann activities. The aggregation of these schedules is assurred to approxi-
mate the loan demand schedule where contractual interest rates and imrginal re-
turns to productive investIIEnts are equated. This approach ignores the internal 
financing capability of the finn-household and rrakes several critical assunptions: 
fann investrents enconpass most of the things which the household can do with ad-
di tiona.l liquidity,; and borrowers perceive the ccntractual rate of interest en 
loans to be the "price of credit." As will be shown later, these assurrptions 
rest on shaky fotmdations. 
.· . . 
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'lhe second methodological problem is to determine the "price of credit" 
which should be used in analysis of loan demand. In most low income countries, 
contractual interest rates on formal loans are administered and change ver-y 
little over tinE or among different groups of borrowers. This lack of varia-
tion nekes it difficult to apply statistical tools to the study of loan demand. 
Moreover, it is not clear if the contractual interest rate is the correct "price" 
to use in this type of analysis. At least two other measures might be used as 
the variable on which borrowing decisions are based. One is the real rate of 
interest. 'Ibis is the contractual rate of interest adjusted by changes in some 
price index. If prices in general decrease over the term of the loan, the real 
rate of interest is higher than the contractual rate. This was the case m the 
United States during the mid-1930's. If prices in general mcrease, the real 
rate is lower than the contractual rate,'. and the real rate of mterest is negative. 
~ Only when general prices do not change over the loan period are contractual 
rates of interest equal to real rates of interest. 
Another measure of "credit price" which might be used is the effective 
costs of borrowing a unit of money for a specific period. 'Ibis measure in-
cludes the interest charges, service fees on the loan, and all other costs in-
curred in transacting the loan. As will be noted later, these transaction 
costs my be ver-y substantial. Only when non-interest costs of borrowing are 
nil, and price indexes do not change over the period of the loan, are all three 
measures of "credit price" equal. 
Which "price", or combination of "prices", to use in loan derrand analysis 
is an enpirical question. In the following discussion we will show that there 
may be substantial differences among these three prices in specific situations. 
We will conclude by arguing that contractual rates of interest may have a rela-
(., tively weak effect on loan demand, especially anong small farners. 
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Inflation and Real Rates of Interest 
Inflationary pressures have been particularly strong in recent years, es-
pecially in most low incoITE countries (LIC's). As can be noted in Table 1, the 
average change in worldwide consumer prices have ranged from six to fi~een per-
cent annually over the 1971 to 1975 period. Over the saJTE period, consumer 
prices accelerated from 10 percent per year to near 30 percent per year in low 
incoITE countries. Inflation has been particularly intense in LIC's in the West-
ern Hemisphere where annual price changes shot up from 16 percent in 1971 to 53 
percent in 1975. 
In a handful of countries, such as saudi Arabia, agricultural loans are 
granted interest free. In several other countries, including Chile, the prin-
cipal of soITE agricultural loans may be indexed to changes in overall prices. 
In most LIC's, however, the contractual interest rates on agr'icultural loans 
~ are quite inflexible and range between six and eighteen percent per year [World 
Bank, p. 79]. 
It is surprisingly difficult to determine the average contractual interest 
rate charged on formal agricultural credit. This is due to the variety of 
rates levied on various loans. Recently in Brazil, for example, interest rates 
ranged from 0 to 15 percent annually on various types of agricultural loans. 
Other practices such as discounting interest paYJTEnts in advance, compensatory 
balances, and other management and supervisory service fees further complicate 
the analysis of contractual interest rates. Despite these ITEasurement problems, 
there is little doubt that average contractual rates of interest on fonnal agri-
cultural loans in most LIC's have been lower than the rate of inflation the 
past few years. As a result, sorre borrowers have been receiving incoITE trans-
fers through "paying" negative real rates of interest on loans. 
,.. 
" 
,.. 
TABIE 1: Weighted Annual Rates of Change in Consumer Prices in 
the World and Among Various Groups of Countries 1971-1975* 
1971 1972 1973 197li 1275 
World 6.0 5.8 9.5 15.1 13.4 
Industrial Countries 5.1 4.5 7.5 12.6 10.7 
Less Developed Countries 9.6 12.2 20.3 29.4 27.6 
Western Hemisphere 16.2 22.1 31.4 38.4 53.0 
Middle Fast 6.2 6.0 11. 7 20.2 19.4 
Asia 5.6 7.5 16.5 29.8 10.0 
Africa 6.4 5.4 9.3 19.2 17.3 
I 
\Jl 
I 
Selected Countries 
Bangladesh 6.3** 5.2** 45.3 54.4 24.4 
Brazil 20.2 16.7 12.6 27.5 29.0 
Colombia 9.1 14.3 22.8 24.5 26.1 
Korea 12.1 11.8 3.1 23.6 26.2 
Taiwan 2.9 3.0 8.2 48.1 5.6 
Source: International Financial Statistics, Vol. 29, No's. 1 and 6, January and June 1976, pp. 34 and 36. 
* Weighted by gross domestic product figures 
** Changes in consurner price indexes for Pakistan. 
' 
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Unexpected surges in inflation, such as occurred in Taiwan in 1974 (Table 1) 
probably have little effect on borrowing decisions.JI Persistent, almost cronic 
inflation, such as has existed in Brazil for the last several decades undoubtedly 
does affect borrowing decisions. When borrowers expect negative real rates of 
interest on their loans, anomalous investment behavior occurs. A large land-
owner in Chile, for exarrple, with arrple access to negatively priced credit may 
find it profitable to buy additional tractors, even though he underutilizes the 
tractors he already owns. With rapid inflation, his tractors increase in nomin-
al value faster than the total costs of depreciation and interest charges on 
his loan. As a result, he receives an :implied income transfer through the loan 
transaction. 
An exarrple of how this income transfer might take place is shown in Table 2. 
Assurre that a loan for $100 is ma.de for 12 months at 12 percent per year, and 
C, that the expected and realized rate of inflation is 36 percent. Also assume 
that the borrower incurs no loan transaction costs beyond the interest charges, 
and that the borrower invests the loan in some nonperishable inventory which 
increases in nom:ina.l value at the same rate as inflation. At the end of the 
' 
loan period the borrower repays the $100 principal plus $12 in interest. The 
purchasing power of the $112 expressed in the prices which existed at the t:iJre 
the loan was granted, however, is only $82. The purchasing power of $18 was 
not returned to the lender despite the $12 interest payment. If the borrower 
sold his inventory for $136, and only had to repay $112 for the loan, he is 
left with a $24 profit from the loan transaction. In prices current at the 
start of the loan cycle, the borrower received the $18 of purchasing power 
not returned to the lender. 
The opportunity to enjoy these inco:rre transfers can have a very strong im-
pact on the decision to borrow. This is especially the case for those borrowers 
' 
' 
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TABLE 2: Incore Transfer Example 
Assumptions 
Loan value t 1 
Annual contractual interest rate 
Term of loan t1 to t2 
Expected and actual rate of 
inflation t1 to t2 
CPI t1 = 100 
CPI t 2 = 136 
Additional transaction costs for boITower 
Borrower invests loan in additional 
non-perishable inventory which increases 
in nominal value at sa.rre rate as CPI changes 
Incane Transfer 
Loan repayment in t 2 
Interest paynent in t 2 
Total 
Purchasing power in t 1 prices 
Value of additional inventory t2 
Less loan and interest paid 
Net incore transfer 
Purchasing power in t 1 prices 
$100 
12% 
12 months 
36% 
nil 
$100 
$ 12 
$112 
$136 
$112 
$ 24 
$82 
$82 
$18 
$18 
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~ who incur relatively few loan transaction costs beyond the interest charges. 
Many small borrowers, and fa.rrrers borrowing for the first time, however, may 
encounter substantial borrowing costs. 
Borrowing Costs 
Borrowers may incur four types of costs in negotiating, obtaining, and 
repaying a loan. These are: (1) interest payments made to the lender, (2) 
additional transaction charges collected by the lender beyond the interest 
payments, (3) loan transaction costs paid by the borrower to someone other 
than the lender, and (4) the borrower's time and other costs which result from 
the loan transaction. A few examples of each of the non-interest costs may 
clarify their nature and ~ortance. 
In many countries, lenders are allowed to charge service fees, closing 
costs, or bill the borrower for loan paperwork. In some cases a payment for 
' interest may be deducted in advance, or the borrower may be forced to maintain 
a compensatory balance with the lender, or the borrower may be forced to buy 
other lender services in order to get a loan. These techniques are thinly 
disguised ways of avoiding usury regulations and of increasing the price paid 
for the loan. Informal lenders may accomplish the sarre results by tying the 
sale of inputs or products to the granting of a loan. They may also require 
various personal services from the borrower as part of the loan obligation. 
In some cases, these additional transaction costs paid to the lender can be 
a substantial part of the costs of borrowing. 
Formal lenders in a number of low income countries require prospective 
borrowers to do paperwork outside the lending agency. This may include appli-
cation charges, certification of various forms, and proof of land ownership. 
In some cases, the lender may require a new borrower to pay for an independent 
audit of his assets. Bribes are required, in some cases, before the applicant 
can receive favorable consideration of his loan application. 
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SonE boITowers find that the time and other costs of getting a loan may 
make up a large part of their total costs of boITowing. Because the credit 
needs of fanners are quite seasonal, borrowers are usually lined up outside 
the offices of formal lenders several weeks before planting begins. In sore 
cases fanners may spend one or two days waiting in line to negotiate a loan. 
In addition, loan offices typically are located at some distance from the resi-
dence of boITOwers. It may take the potential boITower a full day or more to 
go to town each time he makes contact with the formal lender. The boITOwer 
may be forced to repeat this trip a number of times as he applies for the loan, 
returns to see about final approval, returns to receive several disburseITEnts 
under the loan, and again returns to make repaYirent. 
Fann Level Data 
'I.here are surprisingly few fa.rm level studies which document boITower 
' costs of acquiring forrral loans. We have been able to find only three such 
studies: one in Brazil, one in Bangladesh and one in Colombia. Despite the 
limited coverage of these studies, they give sore valuable insights into the 
nature and make up of sore borrowers' costs. 
Bangladesh Case 
In the mid-1960' s, Shahj ahan and associates studied credit use annng 
roore than 2,500 fanners in what is now Bangladesh. Part of this study reported 
on borrower costs incurred in getting loans from the Agricultural DevelopITEnt 
Bank of Pakistan. During the period of the study, the Agricultural DevelopITEnt 
Bank charged a unifonn seven percent contractual rate of interest on all loans. 
· Borrower costs as determined by the study, are sumnarized in Table 3. In 
this study, all non-interest costs of transacting the loan are lumped together. 
As can be noted, the loan transaction costs and interest charges are arranged 
' in the table by loan-size groups. Unfortunately, the study did not report on 
the average length of term of the loans. Most of the loans, however, were for 
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~ one cropping period. In the table we calculate the effective annualized costs 
of borrowing on assumed six and 12-month loan periods. The average loan prob-
ably falls soJTEwhere between these two ti.nE periods. Since non-interest, loan 
transaction costs are more or less fixed for a given loan, the effective annual-
ized costs of borrowing for that loan will decrease as the ti.nE period over 
which the loan is made lengthens. 
As can be noted in ColUITll1s five and six of Table 3, interest paYIJEnts made 
up less than half the total borrowing costs in most loan size groups for loans 
of both six and 12 months duration. For the smallest loan, interest payments 
made up only nine percent of total borrowing costs on a six-month loan and only 
17 percent on a 12-month loan. In the largest loan-size group, interest paYIJEnts 
made up 40 percent of the borrowing costs of a six-month loan and 57 percent 
for a 12-month loan. If the interest rate charged on all loans was doubled 
(; from seven to 14 percent, borrowers of 50 rupees would only experience an in-
crease of nine percent on their six-month loans and 17 percent on their 12-month 
loans. At the same tiITE, borrowers in the largest loan-size group would see 
their costs of borrowing increase by 40 and 57 percent respectively. 
The effective annualized costs of borrowing, as a percent of the total 
aroount borrowed, are presented in Colll1Tll1s seven and eight of Table 1. As can 
be noted, the rates drop sharply as the size of loan increases. A borrower of 
50 rupees (roughly $10 U.S.) incurs effective annualized borrowing costs equal 
to 74 percent of a six-month formal loan and 40 percent on a 12-rnonth fornal 
loan. For the same periods, borrowers of formal loans worth 1,300 rupees 
(roughly $270 U.S.) faced effective rates of only 18 and 12 percent respectively. 
Brazilian Case 
Nehman analyzed borrowing costs in 1971 aroong a sample of 150 farmers in 
' the State of sao Paulo, Brazil. Small fa.rrrers rrade up about half the sample. 
' 
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TABIE 3: Fa.rrrer Costs of Borrowing in B:lngladesh from the 
Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan in 1963 by Loan-Size Groups 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Aver- Non-Interest Interest Interest Interest Payments Effective 
age Costs of Payment if Payment if as a Percent of Annualized Costs 
Size LoanY Loan Held Loan Held for Total Costs of of Borrowing as 
of for 6 12 MonthsY Borrowing Percent of Loan 
Loan MonthsY for 6 for 12 for 6 for ln 
Months Months Months3/ MonthsY 
In 1963 Rupees51 % % % % 
50 16.73 1. 75 3.50 9 17 74 40 
150 25.54 5.25 10.50 17 29 41 24 
250 30.70 8.75 17.50 22 36 32 19 
350 38.18 12.25 24.50 24 39 29 18 
450 43.59 15.75 31.50 27 42 26 17 
550 70.62 19.25 38.50 21 35 33 20 
650 56.20 22.75 45.50 29 45 24 16 
800 67.10 28.00 56.00 29 45 24 15 
1000 67.51 35.00 70.00 34 51 21 14 
1300 68.58 45.50 91.00 40 57 18 12 
Source: Adapted from Shahj ahan, p. 77. 
1/ Includes application fees, form filling and registration fees, costs for travel 
and entertainment related to acquiring the loan, and value of borrower time 
spent in negotiating the loan. 
2/ In 1963 the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan charged 7 percent annually 
on agricultural loans. 
y ColUIIll1s two plus three divided by column one and multiplied by a factor of two to 
convert to annual rate. 
4/ ColUIIll1s two plus four divided by colUIIll1 one. 
21 In 1963 the exchange rate of rupees for one U.S. dollar was 4.792. 
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Approximately 30 percent of the farmers interviewed had forrral loans. The aver-
age contractual rate of interest on these forrral loans, including a standard 
service charge, was about 13 percent. Table 4 summarizes the borrowing costs 
of those receiving formal credit in the sample. The inforrration in the table 
is presented by borrower's farm size. As can be noted, borrowers in the small-
est farm-size group acquired an average of 680 cruzeiros ($136 U.S.) from for-
mal sources. Borrowers in the largest farm size category averaged 6,871 cruz-
eiros ($1,374 U.S.) in forrral loans. The average interest costs of holding 
the loan six and 12 months and the additional transaction costs of acquiring 
the loan are also shown in the table. 
As in the Bangladesh case, interest charges make up less than half of 
the total borrowing costs of obtaining small loans. For a six-month loan in the 
0 to 20 hectare group interest charges were 29 percent of total borrowing costs 
' and 45 percent for a 12-month loan. The largest borrowers incurred 76 percent 
of their borrowing costs in interest charges for six-month loans and 86 per-
cent on 12-month loans. 
The information in Table 4 also shows that the annualized costs of bor-
rowing drop sharply as the amount of forrral borrowings increase. Borrowers 
of the smallest amounts incurred total borrowing costs equal to 44 percent of 
the value of their six-month loans and 29 percent of their 12-month loans. 
The largest borrowers had percentages of only 18 and 15 percent respectively. 
As Nehman reports, it is little wonder that borrowers of small amounts in the 
sample made substantial use of informal credit sources. These inforrral 
sources charged higher contractual rates of interest. Their other loan trans-
action costs, however, were generally found to be much lower than that of for-
mal lenders. It appeared that the annualized costs of borrowing small arrounts 
' frcm forrml and inforrral sources were quite similar, as a result. 
" 
f' 
TABLE 4: Farmer Costs of Borrowing from Formal Sources 
in State of Sao Paulo, Brazil in 1971 by Farm Size Groups 
1 2 3 
Farm Size_ln Average Form- Non-Interest 
Hectares11 al Loan Size Costs of 
Getting Loan 
4 5 
Interest Paymen~ 
if Loan Held f or.J/ 
Ol'Jfonths- · 12 Months 
6 7 
Interest Charges 
as Percent of 
Total Costs of 
Borrowing 
f\ 
8 9 
Annualized Costs of 
Borrowing as Percent of 
Loan Value 
6 . 12 . . o 
Months1f Months5/ Months§; 
12 
Months11 
-In 1971 Cruzeiros21- ------------Percent------------------------
0-20 680.00 109.00 44.20 88.40 
21-50 3665.00 178.oo 238.23 476.45 
Over 50 6871.00 144.00 446.62 893.23 
Source: Adaptation of Nehrnan, p. 78. 
1/ One hectare equals 2.47 acres. 
'?f In 1971 one cruzeiro equaled .20 dollar U.S . 
.ll Assumes an average interest rate of 13 percent per year. 
4/ Column 4 divided by column 3 plus 4. 
~ Column 5 divided by 3 plus 5. 
29 45 
57 73 
76 86 
61 Columns 3 plus 4 divided by column 2 and multiplied by 2 to convert to annual rate. 
11 Columns 3 plus 5 divided by column 2. 
44 29 
22 18 
18 15 I I-' 
w 
I 
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Coloot>ian Case 
In 1973-74, Villamil studied credit use among 63 farmers in the central part 
of Coloni:>ia. All of the farmers in his sample operated less than 20 hectares of 
land, and :rrost had less than 10 hectares. The area studied is somewhat typical 
of rrBny low income farming areas clinging to the sides of :rrountains in Colombia. 
The study reports on credit use and costs of acquiring credit for 1972 and 1973. 
Approximately 30 percent of the loans held by this group of farmers came 
frcm fonna.l sources; this was about 45 percent of the total amount borrowed by 
the group. The contractual interest rate plus service fees charged on these 
formal loans averaged about 13 percent per year. Most of the farmers in the 
sanple borrowed from both formal and info:rnial sources. Fa.rrrers, nevertheless, 
were getting rruch less fo:rnial credit than they requested. Their extensive use 
of informal credit can also be partially explained by the costs of borrowing 
frcm formal sources. Villamil found that contractual interest charges and 
service fees on fonna.l loans only averaged 30 percent of the costs of borrowing. 
On an annualized basis, borrowers were incurring 42 percent. of the total value 
of their fo:rnial loans in borrowing costs. This was only moderately lower than 
the average 47 percent which borrowers expended iri acquiring all types of loans, 
formal and info:rnial. As in the Bangladesh and Brazilian cases, small borrowers 
experienced higher annualized borrowing costs for their fo:rnial loans than did 
larger borrowers. 
Costs for New Borrowers 
New clients of f o:rnial lenders can expect to incur more loan transaction costs 
than 1ndi viduals who have previously borrowed from the same lender. This includes 
waiting costs while the lender takes ti.m= to assemble more infonna.tion on the 
new client, :rrore paperwork to be completed by new borrowers, and the possibility 
' that new applicants may be forced to visit the lender :rrore tires to negotiate the 
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loan. New applicants also have a lower probability of getting their loans ap-
proved for the amount requested than do established borrowers. As a result of 
these factors, a new applicant for forma.l credit probably faces annualized costs 
of borrowing on his first forrral loan which are substantially higher per unit 
of loan than is true for experienced borrowers. The new applicant also faces 
the prospects that he rray incur substantial forma.l loan transaction costs, be 
denied all or part of his loan request, and be forced to turn to an informa.l 
lender for all or part of his credit requirements. This rray be especially corn-
IJX)n in cases where concessional interest rates on forrral credit induces credit 
derrand which cannot be satisfied by forma.l lenders. 
A simplified example of a hypothetical decision ma.king process by a new, 
forma.l loan applicant is presented in Table 5. The various assumptions used 
in this exanple are approxirrately the same as the empirical results found in 
' Nehrrml' s Brazilian study. 
' 
vie assl..lm2 in Table 5 that a farmer who has never borrowed from a specific 
fonIE.l lender is interested in a 12-rnonth loan for $100, and that he can be 
absolutely sure of getting the loan immediately and with no additional trans-
action costs from an informa.l lender who lives nearby (Option III). The infor-
mal lender insists on an interest rate, however, of 48 percent per year. 
At the sam2 t1me, the farmer has the opportunity of applying for an iden-
tical loan from a forma.l lender (Option I). The interest rate on the forrral 
loan is only 12 percent per year, but because of excess derrand for this conces-
sionally priced credit, the probability of the farmer's loan application being 
approved is only .5. Furthermore, the fa.mer knows it will cost him $16 in 
various costs associated with preparing the loan application before he gets a 
yes or nc decision on his loan. If the loan is approved, he also lmows that 
' 
' 
t 
Formal Lender 
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TABLE 5: Hypothetical Decision Making Paths 
of a New Formal Borrower 
(Option I) 
Borrowing 
Decision------. 
1. Loan size $100 $100 
2. Loan term 12 months 12 months 
(Option III) 3. Transaction costs to get yes or no loan decision $ 16 
4. Probability of not 
getting loan . 5 ---. 
5. Contractual Interest Rate 12% 
6. Transaction costs after 
loan is approved $ 16 
(Option II) Informal Lender 
1. Loan size 
2. Loan term 
3. Transaction costs to 
get yes or no loan 
decision 
4. Probability of get-
ting loan 
5. Contractual inter-
est rate 
6. Transaction costs 
after loan is 
approved 
Effective Annual Costs of Borrowing 
A. Option I (16 + 12 + 16) 44% 
B. Option II (16 + 48) 64% 
C. Option III 48% 
D. Expected costs of 
Option #1 and Option #2 
(44 + 64) .. 5 = 54% 
$100 
12 months 
nil 
LO 
48% 
nil 
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he must incur another $16 in loan transaction costs to fully negotiate and repay 
the loan. His annualized costs of boITowing f'rom the formal lender, assuming 
his application is approved, is 44 percent per year. 
The farmer recognizes, however, that he only has a one-out-of-two chance 
of getting the fonnal loan. He also recognizes that he may end up spending $16 
to transact his formal loan application, have his application refused, and end 
up paying the infornial lender $48 to borrow $100. The farmer's annualized costs 
of borrowing under Option II would be 64 percent. A priori, the farmer would 
have an expected price for credit via Options I and II of 54 percent [(44 + 64) 
X • 5] . In this particular example, the farmer would have a lower expected cost 
of borrowing if he first.selected the informal lender (Option III) rather than 
take his chances with the fonnal lender. 
The example in Table 5 can be made more complex by changing some of the 
~ simplifying assumptions. In some cases, for example, the probability of ob-
taining an infonnal loan may be less than 1.0, and there may be certain trans-
action costs associated with infonnal loans. Also, in some cases, the prob-
ability of getting an infonnal loan may decrease if the boITower first applies 
to a fonnal lender. 
' 
The example can be further complicated by including changes in expected 
prices in the decision Il13.king process. Under some circtm1Stances, expected 
changes in overall prices would have little or no effect on the relative de-
sirability of fornal and infonnal loans. This would be especially true if 
both types of loans were repaid in cash, and the real costs of borrowing for 
both types of loans were positive. If, however, informa.l borrowers repaid 
their loans in-kind while formal borrowers repaid 1n cash, the relative at-
tractiveness of the two loan sources might be altered by expected price changes. 
' 
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Under these circumstances, other things being equal, expected price increases 
wo..lld make forrrE.l loans more desirable than inforrrE.l loans. Expected price de-
creases would make the inforrrE.l loans more attractive. 
Loan decisions also will be seriously affected in those cases where ex-
pectations are that price increase will be large enough to cause the real costs 
of fonral loans to be negative, while the real borrowing costs of inforrrE.l 
loans are positive. As indicated earlier, with these conditions the borrowers 
of formal credit may receive an income transfer through the loan transaction. 
Those borrowers who have a choice, will attempt to gain access to this income 
transfer. 
The relative desirability of borrowing from formal and informal sources 
can be altered substantially by changing these various assumptions. To the 
extent that the assumptions in Table 5 are realistic, however, it appears that 
' borrowers of small amounts in Brazil may be very rational in opting to use 
informal sources. Interest rates on formal loans may be much less important 
to borrowers of small amounts than are transaction costs, the dignity with 
which the lender treats the borrower, the probabilities of getting the loan, 
and assurances that additional credit is available if emergencies arise. 
Interest Costs and Total Economic Activity 
To this point we have presented data which suggest that interest costs 
may make up less than half the borrowing costs among rural borrowers of small 
amounts. As can be noted in Tables 6 and 7, it also appears that interest pay-
ments make up a relatively small proportion of the economic activities of 
sne.11 fa.rners in countries like Taiwan and Korea. 
The farm-households in Taiwan, from which data in Table 6 are drawn, make 
heavy use of credit. In 1960, year-end credit balances amounted to .76 of to-
' tal farm operating expenses, . 36 of total farm-household cash expenses, and 
"" 
f' 
TABIB 6: Ratios of Credit and Interest Payments to Expenses and Family 
Income Among Farm Record Keeping Households in Taiwan 1960, 1966 and 1972 
flt 
No. of Total End of Year Credit Balance Total Interest Payments as 
Year Households as a Percent of a Percent of 
Operating Total Cash Net Farm Operating Total Cash Net Farm 
Exoenses Exoenses Family Income Exnenses Exnenses Family Income 
-Number-
----- ----------·-------~----Percent---------~---------- ------
1960 95 76 36 34 1. 7 .8 
1966 430 74 31 36 1. 7 .8 
1972 452 58 24 38 1.9 .8 
Source: Departrrent of Agriculture and Forestry, Provincial Government of Taiwan, Farm Record Keeping 
Accounts 1960, 1966 and 1972. . 
.9 
1.9 
1.3 
I 
I-' 
\.0 
I 
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~ .34 of net farm family income. In 1972 these ratios were .58, .24 and .38 re-
spectively. Even though these farm-households made extensive use of credit, 
total interest payments were a very small part of their total economic activi-
ties. In 1960, interest payments amounted to only 1.7 percent of total farm 
operating expenses, 1.8 percent of total farm-household cash expenses, and 
only .9 percent of net farm family income. These percentages changed very 
little in 1966 and 1972. 
The ratios in Table 7 indicate that Korean farmers were using relatively 
less credit than the Taiwanese fa.mers. In 1965, year-end credit balances amounted 
to 47 percent of farm operating expenses, 16 percent of total farm-household 
cash expenses, and less than 10 percent of net farm family income. All of 
these percentages dropped significantly by 1974. Partly because contractual 
interest rates on formal loans were higher in Korea than in Taiwan, interest 
' payments amounted to a larger percentage of expenses and income in Korea. In 
1965 interest charges amounted to seven percent of farm operating expenses, 
' 
three percent of total farm-household cash expenses, and one percent of net 
farm family income. All three of these percentages decreased through 1974. 
,.. 
Year 
1965 
1968 
1971 
1974 
" 
TABLE 7: Ratios of Credit and Interest Payments to Expenses and Family 
Incorre Among Fann Record Keeping Households in Korea 1965, 1968, 1971 and 1974 
,, 
No. of Total End of Year Credit Balance Total Interest Payments as 
Households as a Percent of a Percent of 
Operating Total Cash Net Farm Operating Total Cash Net Farm 
&roenses Exoenses Family Income Expenses Exoenses Family Income 
-Number- ----- --------·--------Percent---------
------------------------
1172 47 16 9 7 2.5 1.4 
1181 44 14 8 8 2.3 1.3 
1180 24 6 3 7 1. 7 .8 
2515 27 8 4 6 1.8 .9 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, The Republic of Korea, Report on the Results of Farm-Household 
Economy Survey, various issues 1965-1975. 
I 
I'\) 
1--' 
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~ Policy 1rrplications 
AB a result of the preceeding discussion, we conclude that contractual 
interest rates are likely to have a weak effect on the demand for forma.l credit 
by new borrowers and borrowers of small amounts. Expenditures on interest by 
borrowers of small amounts appear to make up only a small part of their total 
economic activity. More i.rrportantly, non-interest, loan transaction costs 
appear to constitute a large part of total borrowing costs for both groups of 
individuals. We conclude that policy makers should not stress low interest 
rates if they want to stimulate loan demand among the rural poor. Reducing 
borrcMer's loan transaction costs and increasing the probability that forma.l 
loan requests will be approved will be much more effective. 
SoIIE people have argued that low interest rates on agricultural credit 
are an eaBy way or' "subidizing" the rural poor. Unfortunately, in most low 
' incare countries this "subidy" reaches only the well-to-do. As Gonzalez-Vega 
has pointed out, the low interest rates, often negative in real terms, force 
fonre.l lenders to concentrate their concessionally priced loans in the hands 
of relatively few people. 'Ihe i.rrplied incoIIE transfer associated with these 
negatively priced loans induce al.mJst unlimited loan demand among the economi-
cally powerful. Forma.l lenders minimize their lending costs by making large 
loans to the well-to-do who have well defined collateral and established credit 
ratings. Formal lenders make only token loans to rural poor and can only be 
forced to lend more to this group through extrerrely heavy political pressure. 
Since the inplied credit subidy is proportional to the amount borrowed, vecy 
little of the incoIIE transfer trickles down to the rural poor. 
Because lending to borrowers of srmll arrounts or new borrowers is less 
prof~table than lending to the well-to-do under these conditions, formal 
lenders tend to errect administrative hurdles which increase loan transaction 
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costs for the rural poor. The rich are able to get additional loans through a 
sirrple costless telephone call. The poor face large lines, numerous visits 
to the formal lender, a good deal of paperwork, and in some cases the need 
to bribe decision makers before they have access to the "credit goodies." 
Higher, and nore flexible interest rate policies would change this. The higher 
rates would cause large boITowers to reduce their use of formal agricultural 
loans, and to rely rrore heavily on their own capital. '!his would result in 
f orma.l lenders having rrore loanable funds which could be directed to new bor-
rowers and boITowers of srra.11 aroounts. The higher interest rates would make 
it more profitable for formal lenders to actively seek this new business. In 
doing so, formal lenders would be forced to reduce and eliminate some of the 
loan acquisition hurdles which currently inflate the fornnl boITowing costs 
of many rural poor. The formal lender would be forced to adapt sorre of the 
' borrowing convenience offered by informal lenders. 
' 
The net result of increasing interest rates on agricultural loans would 
be to reduce or eliminate the income transfer cUITently going to the well-to-
do, rrake more credit available for the rural poor, bring formal lending into 
rrore direct con:petition with informal lenders, and possibly cause the total 
costs of borrowing by rural poor from formal sources to decline. 'Ihat is, 
the loan transactions costs for rural poor to acquire formal loans may be 
reduced rrore than their interest charges on formal loans are increased. 
Current interest rate policies in most LIC's neither allow the rural 
poor to use DDre formal credit nor help eliminate rronopoly profits in informal 
credit markets. Rather, these policies direct the formal lenders activities 
away from providing financial services to low incane people in rural areas. 
If policy makers want to increase the access of rural poor to financial ser-
vices, these interest rate policies rrust be changed. 
" . 
' 
' 
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Footnotes 
* Part of the research reported on in this paper was financed by the Agency for 
International Developrrent. 'The authors received helpful co11111:mts from I. J. 
Singh and Francis Walker, Ohio State University, and Henry Miles, USAID/ 
Paraguay, and George Wohanka, CUNA International in Paraguay. 
** 'Ihe authors are respectively professor of agricultural economics, '!he Ohio 
State University, and Planning Advisor, the Paraguayan Ministry of Agriculture. 
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